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ABSTRACT 
 
The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC) is generally regarded as a 
success story for economic integration in Arab countries. The idea of regional integration 
gained ground by signing the GCC Charter. It envisioned a closer economic relationship 
between member states. Although economic integration among GCC member states is an 
ambitious step in the right direction, there are gaps and challenges ahead. The best way to 
address the gaps and challenges that exist in formulating integration processes in the 
GCC is to start with a clear set of rules and put the necessary mechanisms in place. 
Integration attempts must also exhibit a high level of commitment in order to deflect 
dynamics of disintegration that have all too often frustrated meaningful integration in 
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Arab countries. If the GCC can address these issues, it could become an economic 
powerhouse within Arab countries and even Asia.   
I. Introduction  
        
       The current era is characterized by the proliferation of regional trade agreements 
around the world.1 In light of the slow progress made to conclude the Doha Round of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), an avalanche of bilateral and regional free trade 
agreements will fill in the vacuum. The legacy of the failure of multilateralism is a 
renewed global push toward bilateralism.         
       Arab countries have embarked upon ambitious continental integration efforts 
designed to fulfill their developmental goals.2 The principles surrounding Arab 
economics, their economic integration focus, are the same as for any regional integration: 
combining the resources of constituent members in an effort to achieve economies of 
scale, comparative advantages, and development.3 Arab countries have had several sub-
                                               
1 Looking at regional integration, one can immediately see the upward pattern of the trend. Between 1978 
and 1991, the number of regional trade agreements (RTAs) remained nearly static. Since the beginning of 
the 1990s, the trend was reversed and one could observe a constant dramatic increase in the number of 
RTAs that are being formed. From 42 RTAs notified to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) according to Article 7(a) of the GATT in 1991, the number increased by 107% to 87 Agreements 
in 1998. See Matthew W. Barrier, Regionalization: The Choice of a New Millennium, 9 Currents: 
International Trade Law Journal 25, 27 (2000). According to the World Trade Organization (WTO), there 
are currently 170 RTAs in force. The WTO expects the total number of RTAs to rise to nearly 320 by the 
end of 2009. 
2 Arab Countries are: Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, 
Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestinian Autonomous Territories, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, 
Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. 
3 The theory of comparative advantage suggests that countries will trade goods which they are most 
efficient in producing. Also, trading blocks create trade opportunities (trade creating) though admittedly 
with some trade diversion. Trade creation suggests that there will be more opportunities for efficient 
operations to excel, in large part because of the rearrangement of productive tasks among countries with 
different comparative advantages - tasks that lead to freely tradable goods within economic integration, 
which in turn results in the development of more efficient operations due to the increased competition. The 
increased competition is accompanied by, however, increased market size and, in theory, an increase in 
economic activity. See Raj Bhala, International Trade Law: Theory and Practice 635-650 (2d ed. 2001).   
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continental regional arrangements for years.4 However, the Cooperation Council for the 
Arab States of the Gulf (GCC) is generally regarded as a success insofar as its 
incarnations as a free trade area, a customs union, and a common market are concerned. 
The outcome of the GCC is still an unfolding drama of integration.  
       The GCC was established in May of 1981. The GCC consists of six member states: 
(1) United Arab Emirates; (2) Bahrain; (3) Saudi Arabia; (4) Oman; (5) Kuwait; and (6) 
Qatar.5 While there are many elements which led to the establishment of the GCC, chief 
among them was to foster economic integration between members, increase their 
bargaining power in international relations and, through collective security, to guard 
against any threat from neighboring states. More specifically, the GCC was formed 
against the backdrop of the Islamic revolution in Iran and the Iraq-Iran war. In those state 
of affairs, GCC credibility depended on the ability of its member states to consolidate and 
build upon the common foreign and security concerns they face. In addition, the 
differences among the member states of GCC are negligible as they share history, 
political structures, languages, and cultural habits.6 Structurally, the GCC is helped along 
by the fact that it has a manageable number of states and a high level of development. 
Thus, GCC members share an already existent common identity and cohesion. 
                                               
4 The fact that the experiences Arab countries have had with integration have not been good or successful 
ones. Several efforts have been made to jump start the integration process, yet none have successfully 
moved integration toward completion of its mandate. Several treaties were signed to accomplish this 
purpose: (1) the Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation Treaty among Member States of the League of 
Arab States in 1950, (2) the Convention for Facilitating Trade and Regulating Trade Transit in 1953, and 
(3) the Arab Economic Unity Agreement in 1957. In addition, some attempts for Arab Common Market 
took place in 1964. The most recent effort, the Greater Arab Free Trade Area, will be a critical step in 
determining the future of economic integration in Arab countries.  
5 See the Cooperation Council Charter, List of Member States (1981) available at 
<http://www.gccsg.org/eng/index.php?action=Sec-Show&ID=1> (last visited Sep. 13, 2010). 
6 See Stacy Amity Feld, Language and the Globalization of the Economic Market: The Regulation of 
Language as a Barrier to Free Trade, 31 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 153, 158 (1998) (discussing how language 
must be recognized and reckoned with as an important factor of the economy. Economic integration cannot 
be viewed independent of cultural or sociopolitical factors).  
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       It might be assumed that the U.S. participated actively in the birth of the GCC. Part 
of the reason for U.S. involvement was the desire to stem Islamic extremism and Iran 
influence in the Gulf region.7 Also, the U.S. had a vision of an international economic 
system conducive to free trade and unfettered investment. In modern times, the U.S. 
President announced his initiative to create a Middle East Free Trade Area by 2013.8 This 
initiative is designed to deepen U.S. trade relationships with all countries of the region, 
through steps tailored to individual countries' level of development. Since that 
announcement, the U.S. has concluded FTA negotiations with Bahrain and has signed 
Trade and Investment Framework Agreements (TIFAs) with Saudi Arabia, the United 
Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, Yemen, and now with Oman.9 With the U.S. as a trade 
partner, its involvement exhibits a desire for peace, stability, and economic opportunity in 
the Gulf region. 
       The idea of regional integration gained ground by signing the GCC Charter. It 
envisioned a closer economic relationship between member states. The aim of the GCC 
was to promote cooperation in all fields of economic activity in order to increase and 
maintain economic stability, fostering closer relations among its members, and 
                                               
7 See Gawdat Bahgat, American Policy in the Persian Gulf, 24 Fletcher F. World Aff. 143, 153-155 (2000) 
(for the last two decades, Iran has presented the United States government with a difficult dilemma, leading 
to two conflicting pillars in American foreign policy: a desire to promote Washington's economic interests 
around the world and a determination to exert pressure on Tehran to change its behavior on certain foreign 
policy issues with respect to the Middle East peace process, the sponsoring of international terrorism and 
attempts to acquire and develop weapons of mass destruction).  
8 See Mike Allen & Karen DeYoung, Bush Calls Trade Key to Mideast; President Launches Plan for U.S. 
Pact in Region, Wash. Post A01 (May 10, 2003). See also Grary G. Yerkey, President Bush Lays Out 
Broad Plan for Regional FTA with Middle East by 2013, 20 Intl. Trade Rep. (BNA) 856 (May 15, 2003) 
(the U.S. will employ a “building-block” approach. This approach requires, as a first step, a Middle East 
country to accede to the WTO or concluding Trade and Investment Framework Agreement(s) (TIFA). 
Afterward, the U.S. will negotiate FTA with individual countries. Finally, preferably before 2013, a critical 
mass of bilateral FTAs would come together to form the broader US-Middle East FTA). 
9 See Rossella Brevetti, House Approves by Large Margin U.S.-Bahrain Free Trade Agreement, 22 Int'l 
Trade Rep. (BNA) 2031 (December 15, 2005).  See Gary G. Yerkey, U.S. Free Trade Talks with UAE on 
Track to be Completed by Year-end, 23 Intl. Trade Rep. (BNA) 326 (March 2, 2006).  
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contributing to the progress and development of the Gulf region.10  The other founding 
documents that established the GCC, its main organizations, and its executive procedures 
are the Supreme Council Rules of Procedure, the Ministerial Council Rules of Procedure, 
and the Commission for the Settlement of Disputes Rules of Procedure. 
      The European Union (EU) is often touted as the example to follow as far as the GCC 
is concerned. However, one must remember that both GCC and the EU were created with 
completely different objectives and functions.11 The differences between the GCC and 
EU are great that comparison in this regard between them is not productive. Thus, the 
article will examine solely the GCC as an economic integration block. The article is 
divided into two major sections. This article first discusses the governance structure of 
the GCC. The article, then, focuses on the progress and the issues surrounding the GCC 
integration initiatives.  
II. Governing and Institutional Architecture 
  
       Given the logistical problems that could turn into significant political problems of a 
two-tiered system- member states and economic integration institutions- the quality of the 
                                               
10 The aim of the establishment of the GCC can be deduced from the Charter's preamble: "to effect co-
ordination, integration, and interconnections between them in all fields". See the Cooperation Council 
Charter, Preamble (1981) available at <http://www.gccsg.org/eng/index.php?action=Sec-Show&ID=1> 
(last visited July. 20, 2010). 
11 One main difference in the formation of the GCC and EU is that the founding members of the EU united 
to build each other back up from the ravages of World War II. Their economies were wrecked, and in turn, 
each contributing nation found strength in partnership with each other. In contrast, GCC member states 
were in very different positions when the GCC was formed. None of these countries were seeking to 
rebuild their economies or, more importantly, seeking political integration. Instead, GCC member states 
united to seek the advantages a trade block would bring each other. The advantages were purely economic. 
The founding members of the EU were interested in much more than economic integration. The European 
nations were also concerned with surrendering some of their independent sovereignties to further political 
integration. This political integration, along with economic integration, could also be viewed as providing 
strength and protection in case any threat of war was to occur on European lands in the future. Member 
states of GCC expressed clear unwillingness to surrender their individual sovereignties such as the lack of 
an accession provision for new members. See Desmond Dinan, Fifty Years of European Integration: A 
Remarkable Achievement, 31 Fordham Int'l L.J. 1118, 1123-1129 (2008). See also John A. Sandwick, The 
Gulf Co-operation Council: Moderation and Stability an Interdependent World 71-72 (Westview Press, 
1987). 
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GCC governance structure is most important. Quality can be defined as enough structure 
to define the institutions and to allow those institutions serious, actual authority to serve 
as a counterweight to the national interests likely to otherwise stifle governance. 
       The GCC governing structure is composed of the Supreme Council, the Ministerial 
Council, the Secretariat-General, and the Commission for Settlement of Disputes.12 These 
entities have the authority to establish any sub-agencies when necessary.13  
A. The Supreme Council 
       The Supreme Council is the most powerful GCC institution and is the head of the 
GCC governance structure. The Supreme Council is composed of the head of each of the 
member states.14 Its presidency rotates among the member states in alphabetical order. 
The Supreme Council meets annually and the validity of any of its meetings is dependent 
upon the attendance of two-thirds of the member states.15  
       The Supreme Council is the principal legislative body of the GCC and authorizes the 
other GCC entities to implement its decisions in pursuit of its mandate to realize the 
objectives of the GCC. For example, the Supreme Council has the power to amend the 
Charter.16 In addition, the Supreme Council reviews the matters of interest to the member 
states, establishes the higher policy for the GCC, reviews the recommendations and 
reports submitted by the Ministerial Council for approval, reviews the reports prepared 
by the Secretary-General, approves the bases for dealing with other states and 
international organizations, nominates the members of the Commission for the Settlement 
                                               
12 See the Cooperation Council Charter, supra note 10, at art. 6. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. art. 7.  
15 Id. 
16 Id. art. 8. 
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Disputes, and appoints the Secretary-General.17 The authority of the Supreme Council is 
a general one but not is very detailed such as in the case of conflict management and 
other emergencies. 
       The voting of the Supreme Council decides whether or not a particular resolution is 
to be adopted and thus binding on the member states. In the Supreme Council, each 
member has one vote.18 The Charter divides the voting into two kinds, substantive 
matters and procedural matters.19 On the one hand, substantive matters must be approved 
consensus.20 In other words, a particular decision is adopted if each and every member 
state does not veto that decision. Unfortunately, consensus is the first step toward 
disempowering decision-making bodies.21 On the other hand, procedural matters must be 
approved by a majority vote.22 The rationale for dividing matters into substantive and 
procedural indicates that the stakes are high with substantive matters and as such subject 
to consensus decision-making. 
       There is no clear reference in any of the GCC agreements as to what should be 
considered a substantive matter or a procedural matter. In the absence of such a clear 
reference, the Supreme Council can define the meaning of substantive and procedural 
matters. The Rules of Procedure of the Ministerial Council granted the Council the 
                                               
17 Id. 
18 Id. art. 9. 
19 This is somewhat is similar to the European Union. Under the Luxembourg Accord, the member-states 
agreed to regard matters that might otherwise be approved by majority vote as subject to a consensus. See 
P.S.R.F. Mathijsen, A Guide to European Community Law (5th ed. 1990). See also Wolf Sauter, The 
Constitution of the European Union, 4 Colum. J. Eur. L. 27, 33 (1998). 
20 See the Cooperation Council Charter, supra note 10, at art.9.   
21 The Luxembourg Accord of the EU stands as a paradigm example of paralysis in decision-making when 
consensus is required. Other examples include the GATT process; though majority decision-making was 
the rule, few decisions were taken by that rule and instead consensus became the de facto reality. The 
ineffectiveness of the GATT's moribund decision-making, which was a consensus process, led to the 
changes in that area. See John Jackson et al., Legal Problems of International Economic Relations 215 
(2002). 
22 See the Cooperation Council Charter, supra note 10, at art.9.   
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authority to decide what is substantive and what is procedural.23 Although, the Rules of 
Procedures of the Ministerial Council applies to the Ministerial Council, it can be argued 
that by analogy the same could apply to the Supreme Council. 
B. The Ministerial Council 
       The Ministerial Council is composed of the foreign ministers of the member states or 
other designated Ministers.24 In other words, delegates from the appropriate ministries 
may attend depending upon the issue at hand. The Ministerial Council convenes regular 
meetings every three months,25 but it can also convene extraordinary meetings based on 
an invitation by one of the member states. Like the Supreme Council, the Ministerial 
Council's meetings are considered valid if attended by two-thirds of the member states.26  
       The powers of the Ministerial Council are more detailed than the Supreme Council. 
These powers include proposing policies, prepare recommendations, studies and projects 
aimed at developing cooperation and coordination between member states in various 
fields; endeavoring to encourage, develop, and coordinate activities existing between 
member states in all fields; developing existing cooperation between member states' 
industry and Chambers of Commerce, and encouraging the movement of workers who 
are citizens of the member states within the GCC; and reviewing matters referred to it by 
the Supreme Council.27 In summation, in terms of power, the Ministerial Council can 
actually make its own decisions but in other cases can be subject to superior approval. 
                                               
23 The Rules of Procedures of the Ministerial Council states that if there is any disagreement among the 
member states to decide what is substantive and what is procedural, the matter shall be settled by a majority 
vote. See Rules of Procedure of the Ministerial Council, art. 33.2 (May 25, 1981), available at 
<http://www.gcc-sg.org>. This means that the matter to settle what is substantive and what is procedural is 
considered a procedural matter in itself. 
24 See the Cooperation Council Charter, supra note 10, at art.11.   
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. art. 12.  
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       Voting in the Ministerial Council is addressed in both the Charter and the Ministerial 
Council Rules of Procedure. Like the Supreme Council, each member in the Ministerial 
Council has one vote.28 Again both agreements divide voting into two categories, 
substantive matters and procedural matters. Like the voting rules for the Supreme 
Council, resolutions on substantive matters must be approved unanimously and 
resolutions on procedural matters must be approved by the majority.29 However, unlike 
the voting rules for the Supreme Council, the Ministerial Council Rules of Procedure 
explicitly has the authority to resolve the issue of substantive and procedural.  
C. The Secretariat General 
       The Secretariat is composed of a Secretary General and other necessary assistants 
and staff members.30 The Secretary General should be a citizen of the GCC and is 
appointed by the Supreme Council for a period of three years, which may only be 
renewed once.31 The number of professional civil servants who work in the GCC 
Secretariat remains unclear.32 However, one anticipates that the Secretariat consists of 
primarily trade economists and trade lawyers.    
       The capacity of the Secretariat to affect outcomes, however, depends on what it 
actually does and the saliency of the issues at stake. The Secretariat performs primarily 
three functions in the GCC process: the organization of meetings and recording of 
minutes; research on GCC issues; and follow up the implementation by member states of 
                                               
28 Id. art. 13.   
29 Id. art. 13. See also Rules of Procedures of the Ministerial Council, supra note 23, art. 33.1.  
30 See the Cooperation Council Charter, supra note 10, at art. 14.  
31 Id. 
32 The total size of the WTO Secretariat is around 630 persons, a large proportion of whom are translators 
and support staff, compared to a World Bank staff of around 10,000 and an International Monetary Fund 
staff of around 2,700. See WTO, Annual Report 2005, at 105 (2005); The World Bank Staff, <http:// 
worldbank.org> (follow "About" hyperlink; then follow "Staff" hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 3, 2009); The 
IMF at a Glance, <http://www.imf.org> (following "For Journalists" hyperlink, then follow "IMF at a 
glance" hyperlink under Facts and Issues) (last visited April 14, 2010). 
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Supreme Council and Ministerial Council resolutions.33 Although not explicitly stated, 
the secretariat can mediate between member states and liaise with international 
organizations.34 On the basis of their mandate, the Secretariat members, at least at the 
margins, help shape knowledge, frame issues, identify interests, facilitate coalition-
building, and thereby affect outcomes. Thus, the GCC Secretariat appears to have no 
substantive decision-making power and works as an intermediary to facilitate state-to-
state discussions, negotiations and monitoring. The Secretariat role can be viewed as one 
of servicing negotiations and oversight of obligations. The member states of GCC have 
clearly sought to ensure that control over the integration process remains in the hands of 
the member states and not in a group of independent civil servants.  
       The Secretariat must maintain a reputation for impartiality at all times.35 The 
Secretariat is usually cautious not to appear partisan with no direct and clear preference. 
Thus, for example, the Secretariat is discouraged from offering counsel as to how an 
obligation could be interpreted by a member state to facilitate its objective(s). 
       The Secretariat could influence outcomes through its research for instance. Member 
states expect the Secretariat to keep abreast of trade and economic studies, particularly 
those conducted by other international organizations. In distributing information to all 
interested parties, the Secretariat helps create a common base of understanding. Upon 
request, the Secretariat researches and prepares papers on specific issues. By 2010, the 
Secretariat had provided members with fifty-eight papers, totaling hundred of pages.36 
                                               
33 See the Cooperation Council Charter, supra note 10, at art. 15. 
34 This can be deduced by the language of article 15 which entrusts the Secretariat with "any" other task 
assigned to it by the Supreme Council or the Ministerial Council. Id.  
35 Id. art. 16. 
36 See GCC Library English Publication, available at <http://library.gcc-sg.org/English> (last visited Sept. 
10, 2010). 
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Secretariat submissions addressed, among other matter, trade liberalization, economic 
implications of trade liberalization, currency, environment, and regional cooperation. The 
Secretariat's reports are largely informative and not argumentative in tone. 
D. The Commission for Settlement of Disputes  
       Perhaps the most important aspect of the GCC's governance structure is the dispute 
settlement body and process. The dispute settlement body and process play a crucial role 
especially at times when the political will of the integration is questionable. If the dispute 
settlement body is seen independent and able to ascertain its power, this will engender 
confidence in an integration scheme. In the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) 
integration example, panels played an important role in strengthening the free trade 
area.37 The binding rulings of NAFTA panels helped clarify valid regulations and policies 
of member states, and they set aside those that did not conform to the obligation to 
liberalize trade.38 
       The GCC Charter establishes the Commission for Settlement of Disputes 
(Commission). The Commission is composed of at least three citizens of the member 
states.39 Panelists of the Commission are not appointed full-time or permanent rather they 
                                               
37 Chapter 19 of NAFTA establishes binational panels to review final determinations of antidumping and 
countervailing duty measures imposed under NAFTA parties’ national antidumping and countervailing 
duty law. Binational panels are also permitted to review amendments to the antidumping and countervailing 
duty laws of the NAFTA parties. For more discussion of NAFTA’s dispute resolution processes under 
chapter 19 procedure see David S. Huntington, Settling Disputes Under the North American Free Trade 
Agreement, 43 Harvard International Law Journal 407 (1993). See also Myung Hoon Choo, Dispute 
Settlement Mechanisms of Regional Economic Arrangements and Their Effects on the World Trade 
Organization, 13 Temp. Int'l & Comp. L.J. 253, 254 (1999) (arguing that the achievement of "diverse 
policy objectives, i.e., trade liberalization or environmental protection, as well as true harmonization among 
nations" is contingent upon the dispute settlement mechanisms available under the particular regional free 
trade agreement). 
38 See NAFTA Panel Ruling, Tariffs Applied by Canada to Certain U.S.-Origin Agricultural Products, Dec. 
2, 1996, CDA-95-2008-01, NAFTA Panel Ruling, U.S. Safeguard Action Taken on Broomcorn Brooms 
from Mexico, Jan. 30, 1998, USA-97-2008-01.  
39 The Commission has its seat in Riyadh, the capital of Saudi Arabia. See Rules of Procedure of the 
Commission for Settlement of Disputes, art. 4(a) (May 25, 1981), available at <http://www.gcc-sg.org>. 
 12 
are selected on an ad hoc basis.40 As presently drafted, the Charter does not provide any 
guidelines for the selection of panelists of the Commission in terms of their 
qualifications, age, or years of expertise in the area of trade law, policy, or economics 
either in the domestic or international arena. Additionally, the Charter does not indicate 
whether panelists of the Commission would be expected to act in their governmental 
capacity or neutrally. Panelists should be required to serve in their individual capacities 
and not as government representatives, nor as representatives of any organization to 
avoid any political or other undue influence. 
       The Commission has jurisdiction to consider matters referred to it by the Supreme 
Council regarding disputes between member states as well as disputes over the 
interpretation and implementation of the Charter.41 Therefore, the Member State may 
bring an action before the Commission alleging the failure of another member State to 
fulfill the obligations of the Charter, and in these matters the Commission has original 
jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of the Commission may also extend to review decisions or 
actions of the Supreme Council or the Ministerial Council for consistency with the 
Charter. However, the ability of the Commission to hear disputes between Member States 
depends upon discretionary and consensus "referral" by the Supreme Council. Moreover, 
neither the Charter nor the Rules of Procedure of the Commission have any provision for 
individual access, direct or otherwise, to the Commission. Moreover, there is no 
provision regarding the interaction between the Commission and the various national 
courts systems and role of the latter in enhancing regional economic integration. Another 
                                               
40 Id. See also the Cooperation Council Charter, supra note 10, at art. 10. 
41 If a dispute arises over interpretation or implementation of the Charter and such dispute is not resolved 
within the Ministerial Council or the Supreme Council, the Supreme Council may refer such dispute to the 
Commission for the Settlement of Disputes. See Rules of Procedure of the Commission for Settlement of 
Disputes, supra note 39, at art. 3. See also the Cooperation Council Charter, supra note 10, at art. 10. 
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problematic issue is that the Charter is silent about situations where the actions or 
domestic law of a particular Member State - while not in violation of the GCC agreement 
- may nevertheless inadvertently contradict or nullify the purposes of the agreement. At 
any rate, the ultimate authority of the Commission is a subject for future observation and 
certainly a strong argument can be made for adopting these concepts at some point in the 
future. 
       Regarding the recommendations and opinions issued by the Commission, the Rules 
of Procedure of the Commission sets out four guiding points when issuing such 
recommendations. First, the recommendations or the opinions should be in accordance 
with the Charter, international laws and practices, and the principles of Islamic Shariah.42 
Second, the Commission, while considering any dispute and before issuing the final 
recommendation, may ask the Supreme Council to take an interim action called for by 
circumstances.43 Third, the Commission should justify its recommendations by 
specifying the reasons on which they were based.44 Finally, if the opinion is not issued 
unanimously, the dissenting members are entitled to record their dissenting opinion.45 
The Commission's task is considered to be completed upon the submission of its 
recommendations or opinions to the Supreme Council.46  
       The Charter and Rules of Procedure of the Commission do not include any language 
for appellate review process.47 The Charter and Rules of Procedure do not discuss 
                                               
42 Id. art. 9. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. art. 4. 
47 See Nobuo Kiriyama, Institutional Evolution in Economic Integration: A Contribution to Comparative 
Institutional Analysis for International Economic Organization, 19 U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L. 53, 67-68 (1998) 
(emphasizing the role of effective appellate review processes in ensuring predictability and the confidence 
of the parties). 
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whatsoever the scope of the "review" in terms of factual matters, legal substance, or the 
rules and nature of its proceedings. Furthermore, the scope of the review is not 
determined. Thus, because the GCC agreement's dispute settlement mechanism lacks 
depth and specificity, modifications that would significantly enhance the mechanism's 
value, and infuse greater certainty into the dispute settlement process are required. 
       To date, the GCC dispute settlement process has not been used. Lack of use of the 
dispute settlement process is not likely to form an intelligible body of jurisprudence 
providing parties with reliable and consistent interpretations of rules. Further, there are 
several lacunae not addressed by the dispute settlement mechanism.  There are no 
elaborate and detailed criteria for the composition of the panels. Another problem is the 
ambiguity in the scope and jurisdiction of the panel, which could be a major threshold 
issue in determining when and what disputes member countries could refer for resolution. 
Another obstacle is the lack of procedures for the operation of the panel, as well as the 
largely undefined qualifications of its members. In addition, the appellate review process 
is absent as there is lack of scope and the procedure for review of the legal versus 
substantive matters. Still more issues are left open-ended such as the enforcement of 
decisions, procedures for withdrawing and reinstating concessions. 
       Model Rules of Procedures should be developed so as to determine the numbers of 
panelists, their qualifications, expertise, nationality, and remuneration. Model rules of 
procedures may include policies, practices, and procedures for receiving initial and 
rebuttal written submissions, how oral hearings will be conducted before a panel, and 
mandatory time limits for each step. The dispute settlement should call for increased 
transparency in proceedings, in particular the opening up of panel hearings to the public. 
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In regards to the presentation of confidential business information in the panel 
proceedings, portions of any dispute hearing dealing with such confidential information 
would not be open to the public.  
      The Model Rules of Procedures should have an elaborate system of sanctions and 
measures in order to enforce trade norms. The most salient feature of dispute settlement 
under the GCC should be the possibility of authorizing a trade sanction such as the 
suspension of tariff reductions against a scofflaw member for non-compliance. Trade 
sanctions or threat thereof are to taken to ensure that the Arab country in breach brings its 
practices into conformity. There can be other alternatives for trade sanctions. For 
example, instead of trade sanctions, any GCC Member State guilty of illegal trade 
practices could pay a fine equal to the value of the damages assessed. Other alternative 
can be membership sanctions that limit or deny privileges of membership for any GCC 
Member State that fails to comply with the provisions of the agreements. Among the 
membership benefits that can be withdrawn are the right to vote and the ability to obtain 
financial or technical assistance. The goal of these sanctions and measures is to fortify the 
agreement rules and promote respect for them. 
III. Expanding the GCC into a Customs Union, Common Market, and Monetary 
Union 
 
       The integration of the GCC has followed a progression from one stage to another 
while developing its own sense of political structure, its own legal system in relation to 
its member states, and its own pro-business trading environment. Of course, this 
integration is not one that could be formulated and implemented within even a few years. 
Rather, it must be viewed as a long-term process in which there are gradual transitions 
and many intermediate steps that are needed along the way. The member states of the 
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GCC can be seen as fully integrated economically and even more so with the projected 
adoption of their common currency, yet to be named.48 In addition, the GCC continues to 
change and evolve by enacting new agreements that further strengthen the member states' 
ties to each other. There are other integration efforts beyond those technically falling as 
customs union, common market, and monetary union. Agreements of cooperation and 
sector consultation are part of the Gulf integration process.49 As the following sections 
point out that further integration by the members of the GCC will continue to cause the 
members to surrender some of their national sovereignty to a "supranational authority."   
A. The GCC Customs Union 
       The GCC Free Trade Area continued for almost twenty years until the end of 2002 
when it was replaced by the GCC Customs Union. On January 1, 2003, the GCC 
Customs Union took effect marking a quality shift in the joint economic actions between 
its member states. A customs union creates a wider trading area, removes obstacles to 
competition, makes possible a more economic allocation of resources, and thus operates 
to increase production, and raise planes of living. 
       The most distinct difference between a customs union and a free trade area (FTA) is 
that in an FTA, countries are free to set their own external trade policy; whereas in a 
customs union, members as a whole set a common external policy. The biggest advantage 
of a customs union is that, because members have a common external tariff, it facilitates 
deeper integration and allows the members to have simpler internal border formalities, 
possibly none at all.50 In contrast, an FTA leaves external trade policy to individual 
                                               
48 See Disunited Arab Emirates; Monetary union in the Gulf, The Economist (May 23, 2009).  
49 See Economic Agreement, infraa note 59, at Chapters IV, V, VI, and VII.  
50 See The World Bank, Trade Blocs 75 (2000). 
 17 
member governments and faces a problem known as trade deflection or transshipment.51 
That is the problem of the redirection of imports from outside countries through the FTA 
member with the lowest external tariff in order to exploit the tariff differential. The usual 
solution is rules of origin--the apparently reasonable requirement that goods qualifying 
for tariff-free trade should be produced in a member country rather than just passing 
through that country. Countries in an FTA retain the sovereign power to decide 
individually whether, and to what level trade restrictions should be imposed on 
nonmembers. The level of economic and political integration required to establish an 
FTA is not as extensive as a customs union. Thus, an FTA attracts those states preferring 
a loose-knit regional structure.52 A customs union agreement, however, does not 
necessarily imply an overt surrender of national sovereignty. On the other hand, 
establishing identical tariff barriers against imports from nonmembers requires a 
commitment to common decision-making, weakening the ability of participating 
countries to determine national trade policies independently.  
       Article XXIV of GATT embodies the perception that genuine customs unions and 
free trade areas are congruent with the Most-Favored-Nation principle and that regional 
trade agreements ought to be building blocks toward multilateralism.53 A customs union 
eliminates barriers to trade in goods between or among its member and adopts a common 
external tariff that all members of the customs union apply to trade from countries outside 
the union. A customs union is defined in GATT Article XXIV: 8 as the substitution of a 
                                               
51 See Zakir Hafez, Weak Discipline: GATT Article XXIV and the Emerging WTO Jurisprudence on 
RTAs, 79 N. Dak. L. Rev. 879 (2003).  
52 See Richard Gibb, Regionalism in the World Economy, in Continental Trading Blocs: The Growth of 
Regionalism in the World Economy 25 (Richard Gibb & Eieslaw Michalak eds., 1994). 
53 See Report of the Panel, Turkey-Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS34/R, para. 2.2 (May 31, 1999). 
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single customs territory for two or more customs territories, so that duties and other 
restrictive regulations of commerce are eliminated with respect to "substantially all the 
trade" between the constituent territories of the union or at least with respect to 
substantially all the trade in products originating in such territories,54 and substantially 
the same duties and other regulations of commerce are applied by each of the members of 
the union to the trade of territories not included in the union.55 In addition, Article XXIV: 
5 mandates additional requirements by stating that duties and other regulations of 
commerce imposed at the institution of any such union or interim agreement in respect of 
trade with contracting parties not parties to such union or agreement is "not on the whole 
be higher or more restrictive than the general incidence" of the duties and regulations of 
commerce applicable in the constituent territories prior to the formation of such union.56 
The language used for these requirements in Article XXIV of GATT, however, has long 
been criticized for its ambiguity and inconclusiveness. 
       The establishment of a customs union requires a common external tariff scheme, but 
permits constituent members of customs unions flexibility in implementing that 
                                               
54 Exactly what percentage of trade constitutes a "substantial" amount has never been defined in bright-line 
terms. Discussions in GATT Working Parties have centered on whether the concept of "substantial' should 
be understood in qualitative terms (no exclusion of major sectors) or in quantitative terms (percentage of 
trade of the members covered). See World Trade Organization, Analytical index: Guide to GATT law and 
Practice, Vol. 2, 824-27 (1995). The Appellate Body in the Turkey's Restriction on Textile affirmed the 
ordinary meaning of the term "substantially" in the context of sub-paragraph 8(a) appears to provide for 
both qualitative and quantitative components. See Appellate Body Report on Turkey's Restriction on 
Textile, Appellate Body Report, Turkey-Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products, WTO 
Doc. WT/DS34/AB/R, paras. 49-50 (Oct. 22, 1999). 
55 See Annexes to GATT Article XXIV: 8(a),, reprinted in Raj Bhala, International Trade Law Handbook 
250-54 (2d ed. 2001). 
56 The evaluation under paragraph 5(a) of Article XXIV of the general incidence of the duties and other 
regulations of commerce applicable before and after the formation of a customs union shall in respect of 
duties and charges be based upon an overall assessment of weighted average tariff rates and of customs 
duties collected. This assessment shall be based on import statistics for a previous representative period to 
be supplied by the customs union, on a tariff-line basis and in values and quantities, broken down by WTO 
country of origin.   
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scheme.57 Members of a customs union need only apply "substantially the same" duties 
and commerce regulations to countries outside the customs union. Additionally, 
execution of this common tariff scheme must not raise barriers to trade with countries 
outside of the customs union.  
       The basis of customs law in the GCC is the Common Customs Code of the GCC.58 
The Code provides a uniform set of general rules to be implemented by national customs 
authorities to harmonize the application of duties and procedures for processing imports 
into the GCC. The Code mandates the implementation of a common external tariff or 
common customs tariff (CCT) scheme applicable to all third country imports by the 
Member States, as well as requires cooperation between national customs authorities in 
relation to customs matters.59 The common external tariff of the GCC Customs Union is 
5 percent.60 The common external tariff is a flat-rate charge thus erecting a single tariff 
wall which no individual state is free to breach.  
       The CCT is comprised of the tariff classification system embodied in the 
International Convention on the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System 
(Harmonized System) and the Common Customs Tariff.61 The Harmonized System is a 
multipurpose international product nomenclature developed by the World Customs 
                                               
57 Members need not apply "the same duties and other regulations of commerce as other constituent 
members with respect to trade with third countries. See Annexes to GATT Article XXIV, Bhala, supra note 
52.  
58 See the Common Customs Code of the GCC States (January 2003), available at < http://library.gcc-
sg.org/English/Books/customs2003.htm > (last visited June 19, 2010).  
59 Id. art. 9. The Economic Agreement of the GCC countries state that member states shall establish 
uniform minimum Customs tariffs applicable to the products of countries other than GCC member states. 
See Economic Agreement, art. 4.1, (Dec. 31, 2001), available at <http://library.gcc-
sg.org/English/econagreeeng2003.htm>. The Economic Agreement amended and revised the Unified 
Economic Agreement, which was signed and approved on November 11, 1981. See Unified Economic 
Agreement (Nov. 11, 1981), available at <http://www.gcc-sg.org/Economic.html>. 
60 See Implementation Procedures for the Customs Union of the GCC (2003), available at 
<http://www.gccsg.org/eng/index.php?action=Sec-Show&ID=93 > (last visited June 19, 2010).  
61 See International Convention on the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System, June 14, 
1983, 1035 U.N.T.S. 3. (Entered into force Jan. 1, 1988). 
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Organization (WCO). The Harmonized System comprises about 5,000 commodity 
groups, each identified by a 6-digit code, arranged in a legal and logical structure and is 
supported by well-defined rules to achieve uniform classification. The Harmonized 
System is used by more than 190 countries and economies as a basis for their customs 
tariffs and for the collection of international trade statistics.62 The CCT is determined in 
Common Customs Code of the GCC, and consists of several distinct elements.63 These 
include the Combined Nomenclature, preferential tariff provisions between the GCC and 
third countries, and measures providing for a reduction in, or relief from, import duties. 
B. The GCC Common Market Policy 
 
       The GCC common market was created in 2008 by the decision made by the GCC 
leaders at their summit, which was held on December 3, 2007, and was meant to create a 
common market among its six members.64 This common market would include the 
graduated elimination of all customs duties among its members, the creation of a 
common external tariff, the adoption of a common trade policy, and the harmonization of 
economic policies. Moreover, the common market would have to adopt many directives 
and resolutions seeking to eliminate barriers to free trade and to harmonize the legal and 
regulatory systems of the member states, as well as to form the basis of a system of 
community law. 
       The GCC common market would comprise trade that would promote the free 
movement of capital, goods, services, and labor. The Economic Agreement of the GCC 
obliges each Member State to accord other Member States' natural and legal citizens the 
                                               
62 See Position of Contracting Parties to the Harmonized System Convention as of March 31, 2010, 
available at 
<http://www.wcoomd.org/files/1.%20Public%20files/PDFandDocuments/HarmonizedSystem/Situation_as
of31Jan2010.pdf> (last visited August 5, 2010).  
63 See the Common Customs Code of the GCC States, supra note 58, at arts. 19, 67, 69, 77, 89, 95, and 98. 
64 See Gulf Countries Launch Common Market, Jordan Times (Dec. 5, 2007). 
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same treatment,65 which includes: free movement of goods,66 free movement of citizens, 
right of residency,67 free movement of capital,68 the right to work in private and 
government jobs,69 the right to be engaged in all professions and crafts,70 the right to be 
engaged in all economic, investment, and service activities,71 and the right to own stock 
and form corporations.72 Each of these freedoms and rights are crucial if the goal of a 
regional integration is to break down all distinctions among states in the area of economic 
activity. As a result, the common market would involve a deeper level of integration 
within the GCC member states. 
       Does a common market require a common law? Fundamental to the formation of an 
integrated GCC is the creation of a common legal system. A common market cannot 
operate smoothly without certain generally recognized rules and procedures, without a 
core of common legal institutions and convictions.73 Harmonization of laws facilitates 
transactions concluded between different sovereignties and encourages all forms of 
economic exchange.74 Having taken this into consideration, and in order to achieve its 
objectives and aims of establishing a regional block, the GCC attempted to harmonize 
various laws and regulations. For example, the GCC adopted Trade Marks Regulations, 
                                               
65See Economic Agreement, supra note 59, at art. 3. 
66 Synergies are created by movement of goods. However, one has to acknowledge the reality of GCC 
economy based on the export of primary products (oil) and thus unstable terms of trade and limited 
economies of scale for production, especially industrial production. The efforts of economic integration 
should address these factors through economic policies that flow from integration.  
67 Id. art. 3(1). 
68 Id. art. 3(7). 
69 Id. art. 3(2). 
70 Id. art. 3(4). 
71 Id. art. 3(5). 
72 Id. art. 3(9). 
73 See Frederick Abbott, Regional Integration and the Environment: The Evolution of Legal Regimes, 68 
Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 173, 189 (1992).  
74 Harmonization is seen as a transitive verb. There is a harmonizer - the agent of harmonization- and there 
is an object of harmonization - the diverse national laws which must undergo a process of change or 
transformation to reduce or eliminate their differences. Martin Boodman, The Myth of Harmonization of 
Laws, 39 Am. J. Comp. L. 699, 707 (1991). 
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Commercial Agencies Regulations, Common Regulations of Patent, Model law for 
Foreign Investment, Common Commercial Law, Law of Commercial Registry, Common 
Marine Law, Law of Supervision on Insurance, Unified Law of Companies, and the 
Unified Law of Personal Status.75 These common laws and many others are non-
obligatory laws. In other words, member states are not obliged to implement them. 
       Conflict between different legal regimes can be mitigated through a process of 
unification of laws, through adoption of uniform rules that are devised by and adopted by 
separate states. Harmonization of legal rules in the GCC member states has occurred 
through voluntary change - not imposed by a supranational organization - but 
spontaneously by independent national institutions, in order to respond to the GCC 
environment. In order to be in harmony, changes are made, but they are voluntary rather 
than imposed. For example, model laws are devised for submission to the legislatures 
within the GCC member states. 
       The GCC common market would help make the Gulf region more competitive 
globally.76 The perception was that GCC's common market major advantages would be 
economic through increased trade with fewer barriers and economic complementarity, 
and that the impact of these changes would be positive, both short- term and long-term.77 
It would result in a larger, more protected market for the area's products and GCC 
countries would be better off economically. 
                                               
75 This is not an exhaustive list. More details are available in Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the 
Gulf Secretariat, Achievements Synopsis of the Arab States of the Gulf (2009) (in Arabic), available at 
<http://library.gcc-sg.org/book8a01e.htm> (last visited Sept. 1, 2010) 
76 See Gulf Countries Launch Common Market, supra note 64. 
77 Id. 
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       Between 1983 and 2008, trade among the GCC member states increased 
dramatically.78 Trade and investment between GCC member states had quadrupled, and a 
substantial interdependence between the economies of these countries had developed.79 
Indeed, at this point, things were going so well that the idea of a monetary union was 
being discussed. 
C. The Monetary Union 
 
       Monetary union has always been considered to be the next step to economic union in 
the process of economic integration.80 This concept was already in the original text of the 
Economic Agreement which discusses currency unification and monetary union 
according to a specified timetable.81 This unification is to be achieved through the 
harmonization of economic and monetary policies, including banking legislation.82 Thus, 
there is an obligation to arrive at a common monetary policy and creating a common 
currency. 
       The monetary union process began in December 2001.83 The monetary union has two 
main components: 1) the establishment of the Monetary Council and GCC Central Bank 
                                               
78 The volume of Intra-GCC trade increased from less than US $6 billion in 1983 to some US $20 billion in 
2008 i.e. an increase by 75.5% over the past ten years or an average annual growth accounting for some 
7.5%. After the formation of the common market in January 2008, the volume of Intra-GCC trade has 
increased by an annual growth average that exceeded 20%. See Cooperation Council for the Arab States of 
the Gulf Secretariat, supra note 75, at 241. 
79 Id.  
80 Regional integration tends to involve six stages of development: (1) preferential trade arrangement; (2) 
free trade area; (3) customs union; (4) single market; (5) monetary union; and (6) political union. See Bela 
Balassa, The Theory of Economic Integration 2 (1962). See also Myung Hoon Choo, Dispute Settlement 
Mechanisms of Regional Economic Arrangements and their Effects on the World Trade Organization, 13 
Temp. Int'l & Comp. L.J. 253, 255 (1999).  
81 See Economic Agreement, supra note 59,  at art. 4. The single currency is to be created by 2010, as voted 
on by the Cooperation Council's Member State in their Summit on December 30 - 31, 2001. See B. Laabas 
and I. Limam, Are GCC Countries Ready for Currency Union, Arab Planning Institute, Kuwait, at 2, 
available at < http://www.arab-api.org/wps0203.pdf> (Apr. 2002). 
82 See Economic Agreement, supra note 59, art. 4. 
83 Unlike the customs union whereby the member states agreed to a deadline for the implementation of the 
customs union and stated this deadline in the Economic Agreement, the monetary union does not include 
such a deadline. Although, the deadline for the establishment of the monetary union was not stated in the 
Economic Agreement, the member states voted on a deadline of 2010. 
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for the purpose of exercising the primary monetary powers; and 2) the creation of a single 
currency to replace national currencies as the sole legal tender for the member states in 
the GCC.84 It is important to ensure that the GCC Central Bank will have total 
independence in its decision-making. This point represents a crucial policy decision 
because GCC central banks were not independent of their respective governments at the 
time the Monetary Union Agreement was approved.85 If the GCC Central Bank is granted 
full independence it can formulate a single monetary policy no matter how unpopular and 
without regard to political pressure from the participating member states.86 This full 
independence is an important feature of the GCC monetary union to which member states 
have to surrender their sovereignty in order to reap the anticipated benefits of the 
monetary union. 
       To achieve a single currency, there must be an interim period that serves as a period 
designed to ensure a smooth changeover from national currencies to the single currency. 
During this transitional period, businesses and commercial enterprises throughout the 
GCC can be "encouraged "to use the single currency for their accounting and 
transactions. At first, the GCC Central Bank must adopt a policy of "no prohibition, no 
compulsion" use of the single currency. For instance, internal and cross-border payments 
                                               
84 See Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf Secretariat, supra note 75, at 92. 
85 See GCC Central Banks, available at <http://www.centralbank.ae/gcc_central_banks.php> (last visited 
May 5, 2010). 
86 One of the functions of the Central Bank is to conduct the  monetary policy. The Central Bank primarily 
does this through regulation of the banking industry. The Central Bank controls the supply of reserves 
available to banks through the purchase and sale of Treasury bills and through its administration of the 
discount window and discount rate. The Central Bank has the power to create money by purchasing 
Treasury bills on the open market. The Central Bank can contract the money supply by selling Treasury 
bills on the open market.  Creating too much money will cause inflation; contracting the money supply too 
much will lead to recession. The same logic applies to the discount rate. When the discount rate is high, 
banks are discouraged from borrowing, thus somewhat retracting the economy. However, when discount 
rates are low, banks are encouraged to borrow money and lend it to the public, thus increasing the money 
supply. See John W. Head, Getting Down to Basics: Strengthening Financial Systems in Developing 
Countries, 18 Transnat'l Law. 257, 260-266 (2005).  
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made by crediting an account can be made either in the single currency or national 
currency units. In addition, many businesses could adopt voluntary rules of conduct for 
incorporating the single currency during the transitional period. 
       The introduction of the single currency will not only affect the governmental and 
business sectors but also the general population.87 The general population should become 
familiarized with the single currency during the transitional period. For instance, 
merchants could price their goods in the single currency and national currency in order to 
familiarize consumers with the value of the single currency. Moreover, banks could serve 
their clients' deposit and loan accounts on a dual currency basis. It is difficult to gauge the 
percentage of the population that will use the single currency. Therefore, the GCC must 
provide its citizens with information geared towards raising awareness and fostering 
acceptance of the single currency.  
       The introduction of the single currency will have many economic benefits. The 
single currency is expected to decrease consumer prices.88 Business establishments will 
have lower overhead costs because they will no longer pay the exchange commission 
charged when dealing with establishments in other countries. Lower overhead costs will 
produce lower prices for consumers, resulting in an increase in purchasing power for all 
doing business with member states.89 More purchasing power may lead to economic 
growth. An added benefit resulting from the introduction of the single currency is that the 
                                               
87 Currency goes to the heart of people's lives. Currency relates to security, retirement, and kids education. 
The general population considers the right to issue currency is one of the attributes of an independent 
country. Assenting to the introduction of the single currency can be regarded as assenting to a partial loss of 
identity and a surrender of sovereignty. See Robert A. Mundell, Monetary Unions and the Problem of 
Sovereignty, 579 Annals 123, 134 (2002). 
88 See The Petrodollar Peg; Economics Focus, the Economist (Dec. 9, 2006). 
89 See Erbas G. Abed and Guerami, B. S., The GCC Monetary Union: Some considerations for the 
Exchange Rate Regime, IMF Working Paper No 66 (2003).  
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commercial market may become more competitive.90 With a single currency, the price 
differentials in goods among the GCC member states will disappear. Consumers will 
benefit because they will be better able to compare the prices of goods. The single 
currency will eliminate the practice of pricing goods in foreign currencies, and help 
consumers compare product prices. 
       Furthermore, a single currency among GCC countries could reduce or eliminate price 
fluctuations and will encourage companies to plan their trading and long-term 
investments.91 Companies will be able to rely on the single currency and not fear that 
trade agreements will become unprofitable because of huge price fluctuations. Thus, 
contracts will become more stable. A stronger GCC economy and improved trading with 
the single currency could also result in rapid growth in the financial centers of the GCC.92 
Interest in GCC securities could grow because the single currency carries less "currency 
risk" than the currencies of the individual member states. With less currency risk, 
investors have a more stable view of a GCC company's credit and are more likely to trust 
an investment in that company. 
       Although the introduction of the single currency could be economically beneficially, 
there may be problems as well. The implementation of the single currency may lead 
smaller and less efficient companies out of business. Larger competitors may have to cut 
the labor force and streamline their operations to stay competitive with their new rivals 
from other GCC countries.93 There could be also problems with regard to the continuity 
                                               
90 See E. Jadresic, On a Currency for the GCC Countries, IMF Policy Discussion Paper (PDP/02/12) 
(2002). 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 See Beverly Carl and Roberto MacLean, Jr., Trade and Development, 12 Law & Bus. Rev. Am. 473, 478 
(2006).  
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of contracts. The GCC must adopt measures to assure that contracts will remain 
unaffected by the introduction of the single currency.94 The purpose of the principle of 
continuity of contracts is to bar any claim for rescission, cancellation or non-performance 
under national law based on the law of frustration (force majeure or Quwa Qahira), 
impossibility, or inequity.95 Additionally, the single currency system of the GCC may 
create technological problems. Computer systems in the GCC may not be prepared to 
convert the national currencies into the single currency. Problems also could arise with 
automatic teller machines (ATM), as banks will be changing currencies into the single 
currency.  
       When the single currency is implemented, member states will produce millions of 
notes and coins as the new legal tender. The design of these new notes and coins should 
not be underrated.96 The single currency coin could have a common GCC face on one 
side and a national motif of the member state's own choice on the other. The purpose of 
allowing national motifs on the coins is to retain some link with the past. Also other notes 
or coins could depict the GCC without national borders, a symbol which is meant to 
foreshadow the future of the GCC.  
       Now that the framework of the monetary union have been described, it is important 
to discuss the relationship between the member states opting out of the monetary union 
and the GCC as a whole.97 Two member states -Oman and UAE- have opted out of the 
                                               
94 For example the GCC could state that the introduction of the single currency will not have the effect of 
altering any term of a legal instrument or of discharging or excusing performance under any legal 
instrument, nor give a party the right unilaterally to alter or terminate such instrument. 
95 See S. E. Rayner, The Theory of Contracts in Islamic Law: A Comparative Analysis with Particular 
Reference to the Modern Legislation in Kuwait, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates 146, 254, 259-263 
(1991).  
96 See George M. Von Furstenberg, One Region, One Money? 579 Annals 106, 113 (2002). 
97 An important aspect of concerning the monetary union is the flexibility granted to GCC member states. 
The best examples can be found in the ability of member states to opt out of the monetary union. 
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early stages of the monetary system.98 For those member states, there truly is a GCC a la 
carte because they have chosen to adopt the elements which best suited them. The 
underlying reason for opting out could be that the UAE and Oman do not want GCC 
integration in the future to lead to a federal form of government and thus to a close form 
of cooperation.99 It has to be noted that the GCC Charter does not foresee the possibility 
for later withdrawal rather it is something that could only have been negotiated 
beforehand.100 This may perhaps leave the possibility for future "new" member states to 
negotiate an opting-out before they become a member state. 
       As far as the relationships between the member states opting out and the GCC is 
concerned, it is obvious that the UAE and Oman do not participate in all decision-making 
because they are left out of the decision-making process concerning the monetary union. 
In addition this fact plays a part in practice because they have shown they are not willing 
to participate in a further integration process at this time. It is inevitable that such a fact 
influences GCC relationships and politics generally. 
       At any rate, in creating the single currency, the GCC has decided to occupy a place 
on the international scene that is commensurate with their history and their economic 
strength. In so doing, the GCC demonstrates its unity to the rest of the world and 
confirms its presence in the monetary sphere. The GCC can play an important role in 
international institutions responsible for the international monetary system. 
 
                                               
98 In 2009, the UAE announced it was pulling out of talks for monetary union. Oman had already 
withdrawn from the monetary union project in 2007. See Disunited Arab Emirates; Monetary union in the 
Gulf, supra note 48. 
99 The UAE and Oman gave no reason for the decision to withdraw from the monetary union. Id. 
100 See the Cooperation Council Charter, supra note 10. 
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IV. The Relationship between GCC and the WTO 
 
       The GCC does not exist in legal vacuum. Rather, GCC is part of the wider corpus of 
GATT/WTO law.101 However, it was not until recently that GCC was notified to the 
WTO. In November 2006, Saudi Arabia notified the GCC to the WTO.102 The GCC was 
notified as GATT article XXIV customs union.103 Since the GCC was lately notified, 
there are no reviews yet on the agreement, submissions or comments from other WTO 
members.  
       In 2008, the GCC voided GATT article XXIV notification.104 At the same time, the 
GCC notified the Committee on Trade and Development (CTD) under the Enabling 
Clause.105 Now, the GCC will be reviewed under the Enabling Clause. After the change 
in notification made by the GCC, other WTO members seemed bewildered and wary. For 
example, the EU requested for further elaboration on the reasons for this change in 
notification.106 The GCC could have determined that its customs union qualifies under 
GATT article XXIV and the Enabling Clause, but chose the Enabling Clause given the 
                                               
101 The WTO Appellate Body in the United States-Reformulated Gasoline case stated regarding article 3.2 
of the Dispute Settlement Understanding that “direction reflects a measure of recognition that the General 
Agreement on Tariff and Trade is not to be read in “clinical isolation” from public international law.” See 
Appellate Body Report, United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, April 29, 
1996, WTO Doc. No. WT/DS2/AB/R, at 17. 
102 See WTO Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, Gulf Cooperation Council Customs Union – 
Notification from Saudi Arabia, November 20, 2006, WTO Doc. No. WT/REG222/N/1. 
103 Id.  
104 See WTO Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, Gulf Cooperation Council Customs Union – 
Notification from Saudi Arabia – Corrigendum, March 31, 2008, WTO Doc. No. WT/REG222/N/1/Corr.1. 
See also Ben Sharp, Comparing Preferential Trade Agreement Scrutiny under GATT Article XXIV and the 
Enabling Clause: Lessons Learned from the Gulf Cooperation Council, 7 Manchester Journal of 
International Economic Law  56, 57 (2010).  
105 See WTO Committee on Trade and Development, Notification of Regional Trade Agreement, March 
31, 2008, WTO Doc. No. WT/COMTD/N/25. 
106 See WTO Committee on Trade and Development, Gulf Cooperation Council Customs Union – Saudi 
Arabia’s Notification (WT/COMTD/N/25): Communication from Saudi Arabia, July 18, 2008, WTO Doc. 
WT/COMTD/66. 
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developing country status of GCC members. In the alternative, the GCC could have 
thought that its customs union would not pass under Article XXIV, but would under the 
Enabling Clause. Therefore, the GCC changed its notification.  
       To confuse matters further, after the GCC withdrew its customs union notification 
under GATT article XXIV and notified it under the Enabling Clause, it re-notified the 
GCC customs union again under GATT article XXIV.107 The criticism directed at the 
GCC could have caused it to return to the original notification under article XXIV.  
       There are different scenarios that would result if the GCC is notified under article 
XXIV of GATT or under the Enabling Clause because of the differences between these 
two systems. GATT article XXIV condoned the establishment of free trade areas or 
customs union subject to several stringent conditions. For example, any agreement must 
include a plan and schedule for the formation of a free trade area or customs union and 
the formation should be achieved within a "reasonable length of time."108 The issue of 
"reasonable time" was directly addressed during the Uruguay Round negotiations, where 
it was decided that ten years was a reasonable length of time.109 The GCC led to the 
establishment of free trade area among its members in 1983 and customs union in 2003.   
       Article XXIV of GATT requires any contracting party deciding to enter into a free 
trade area, or an interim agreement leading to the formation of such an area, to promptly 
notify the GATT/WTO. This procedural requirement is intended to ensure the 
                                               
107 See WTO Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, Gulf Cooperation Council Customs Union – 
Notification from Saudi Arabia – Revision, November 17, 2009, WTO Doc. No. WT/REG276/N/1/Rev.1. 
108 The word "reasonable," has caused much confusion in its interpretation. There was no agreement on just 
how much time was reasonable. For instance, the Greece-EEC Associations Agreement provided for an 
interim period of twenty-two years before final formation. See Association of Greece with the European 
Economic Community, Nov. 15, 1962, GATT B.I.S.D (11th Supp.) at 149-50 (1963). Sharp, supra note 
104, at 59.  
109 See Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade 1994. 
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transparency of the proposed agreements to other WTO members and provide any 
necessary information for the examination of the agreements under article XXIV by the 
Committee on Regional Trade Agreements. The practice in terms of the timing of 
notification has varied.110 With regard to the GCC, it should have been notified to the 
WTO some time ago. The GCC, however, was only notified to the WTO in November 
2006 despite the fact that it entered into force in 2003.        
       According to the drafters of GATT article XXIV, the objective of trade regionalism 
lies in complementing the global trading system. That is, regional free trade agreements 
and customs unions are to increase trade, not raise barriers to trade with third countries. 
Moreover, GATT article XXIV requires the free trade area or customs union to eliminate 
trade barriers on "substantially all" trade among members.111 Because the GCC was 
notified under article XXIV, the WTO Committee on Regional Trade Agreements will 
examine and scrutinize this agreement more extensively to ensure that the GCC does not 
adversely affect the interests of non-members and to determine how much trade diversion 
it created, if any.112  
       As a general rule, article XXIV applies only to members of the WTO. For example, 
the notification requirements of article XXIV apply to the WTO members of GCC, but 
                                               
110 The Treaty of Rome was signed on March 25, 1957 and notified to the Contracting Parties immediately 
thereafter, with the Treaty entering into force on January 1, 1958. See WTO Secretariat, Regionalism and 
the World Trading System 12-13 (1995).   
111 Discussions in GATT Working Parties have centered on whether the concept of "substantial' should be 
understood in qualitative terms (no exclusion of major sectors) or in quantitative terms (percentage of trade 
of the members covered). See World Trade Organization, Analytical Index: Guide to GATT law and 
Practice, Vol. 2, 824-27 (1995). 
112 On February 6, 1996, the WTO General Council decided to establish the Committee on Regional Trade 
Agreements. Under its terms of reference, the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements is mandated to 
examine regional trade agreements referred to it by the Council for Trade in Goods. See Committee on 
Regional Trade Agreements - Decision of 6 February 1996, WTO Document No. WT/L/127, paragraph 1.a 
(February 7, 1996).   
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not to non-WTO members.113 Preferential agreements with non-members are treated 
under article XXIV.10 of GATT. Even if article XXIV is considered to be applicable 
with regard to the GCC, there is also the possibility of a waiver under article XXIV.10 of 
GATT. Paragraph 10 states that proposals for free trade areas not meeting the criteria 
described in paragraphs 5 to 9 of article XXIV may be approved by a two-thirds majority 
of the contracting parties, provided that such proposals eventually lead to the formation 
of a free trade area. The drafting history indicates that paragraph 10 of article XXIV was 
intended to provide for the supervision free trade areas in which not all participants were 
GATT contracting parties.114 Moreover, it had been shown in practice that the concept 
"territories of contracting parties" included in article XXIV.5 of GATT had not been 
interpreted as restricting the ability of establishing free trade areas which include non-
GATT members.115 In most respects, a free trade agreement that complies with article 
XXIV for WTO members would likely comply for the other free trade agreement 
members as well since it may be difficult to envision free trade agreement provisions that 
are different for WTO members from the other non-WTO members.  
       Article XXIV.12 of GATT secures the observance of its trade rules by regional and 
local government authorities. The WTO members of the GCC must ensure that GATT 
principles are observed by regional and local governments within the territories of those 
                                               
113 Saudi Arabia was latest Gulf country to join the WTO. See Gary G. Yerkey, USTR Announces Bilateral 
Agreement Clearing Way for Saudi Arabia to Join WTO, 22 International Trade Reporter 1481 (September 
15, 2005). Members of the GCC who are also members of the WTO are: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, and UAE. See WTO, Members and Observers, available at 
<http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm> (last visited January 3, 2010). 
114 See WTO Secretariat, supra note 110, at 10.  
115 For example, France obtained a waiver in March 1948 for its proposed customs union with Italy, which 
was not a contracting party to the GATT at that time. In another example, the Working Party on EEC-
Agreements of Association with Tunisia and Morocco approved the established the free trade area although 
Morocco had no relation yet to the GATT at the time. See World Trade Organization, supra note 111, Vol. 
2 at 798-799, 829.     
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GCC members who are also WTO members. No WTO member is responsible under 
article XXIV.12 for regional and local governments that are not within that WTO 
member's territory.   
       Article XXIV is not the only GATT rule that permits the formation of regional trade 
agreements and customs unions.116 The Enabling Clause, agreed to during the Tokyo 
Round, provides for the formation of regional trade agreements among developing 
countries. There is no difference in the notification required by free trade agreements or 
customs unions under GATT article XXIV and the Enabling Clause.117 However, a plan 
and schedule for implementation of the free trade agreement or customs union is required 
under article XXIV:5(c), but not under the Enabling Clause. The Enabling Clause 
includes more lenient criteria compared with GATT article XXIV. For example, unlike 
article XXIV of GATT, the Enabling Clause drops the conditions on the substantial 
coverage of trade and allows developing countries to reduce tariffs on mutual trade in any 
way they wish.118 The lack of the substantially all trade requirement provides flexibility 
for members in determining the pace of tariff reduction and product coverage.  
       Since all members of the GCC are developing countries, it would be covered by 
Enabling Clause, paragraph 2(c) which permits a regional agreement that do not meet the 
requirements of GATT article XXIV. If the GCC is examined under the Enabling Clause, 
the agreement would fall within the jurisdiction of the Committee on Trade and 
Development. On the other hand, if the GCC is examined under GATT article XXIV the 
WTO Committee on Regional Trade Agreements would evaluate the GCC customs 
                                               
116 See Zakir Hafez, Weak Discipline: GATT Article XXIV and the Emerging WTO Jurisprudence on 
RTAs, 79 North Dakota Law Review 879, 886, 900-902 (2003). 
117 See Different and More Favorable Treatment Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing 
Countries, L/4903, art. 4.a (Nov. 28, 1979). 
118 Id. art. 2.c. 
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union.119 Because the GCC is notified under both GATT article XXIV and the Enabling 
Clause and the latter notification has not been withdrawn yet, it could lead to the 
possibility that the GCC customs union could be evaluated under article XXIV and the 
Enabling Clause. No precedent exists regarding dual examination.120 In addition, dual 
examination should be avoided to eliminate the possibility of conflicting rulings. If, for 
example, the Committee on Trade and Development and WTO Committee on Regional 
Trade Agreements came to opposite or different conclusions, this complicated the task of 
multilateral check on regional trade agreements and customs union. At any rate, time will 
tell how the GCC notifications and examinations will be handled.   
       As stated earlier, the GCC and the WTO are not independent of each other; they are 
highly interdependent. The GCC interacts with regional and international systems.121 The 
GCC integration agreements have paid little attention to its relationships with the 
WTO.122 There are references to regional blocks and international organizations and the 
need for the GCC member states to co-ordinate with each other.123 However, these 
references are not enough. These references do not provide an ordered legal framework 
for the relations between the GCC and WTO. Issues such as the status of WTO law 
within the GCC, how the multiple commitments of GCC member states under GCC law 
                                               
119 The WTO Committee on Regional Trade Agreements is often criticized for the toothless scrutiny that is 
often employed on Article XXIV agreements. In fact, there has only been one agreement – between 
Czechoslovakia and Slovakia in 1992 – that has been judged to be fully compliant with this Article. Many 
issues, like inadequate staffing or timid questioning by members perhaps attempting to set a low threshold 
for future scrutiny of trade agreements it is party to, have hampered the work of this Committee, especially 
when considering the rapid increase in these agreements. See Colin Picker, Regional Trade Agreements v. 
the WTO: A Proposal for Reform of Article XXIV to Counter this Institutional Threat, 26 University of 
Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law 267, 278 (2005). 
120 See Sharp, supra note 104, at 58.  
121 See Joost Pauwelyn, Overlaps with the WTO and other Jurisdictions, 13 Minnesota Journal of Global 
Trade 231 (2004). 
122 There are no statements in the GCC Charter or the Economic Agreement which indicates that member 
states are conscious of their obligations, as contracting parties to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization. 
123See Economic Agreement, supra note 59, at art. 2. 
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and WTO law can be reconciled, and the rules for resolving conflicts between WTO law 
and the GCC law have not been addressed by GCC legal documents. These are important 
issues for the stability of the GCC’s economic integration initiatives. Irreconcilable 
differences between GCC law and WTO law can be susceptible to challenges under the 
WTO dispute settlement system.124 It remains to be seen whether GCC's acts will be 
susceptible for WTO challenge as the GCC member states progress and strengthen their 
integration processes.  
V. Relation between GCC and Neighboring Countries 
 
       Since the beginning of GCC's existence, a number of countries have expressed an 
interest in joining the GCC. Yemen, Iraq, Jordan, and Syria are candidates for inclusion 
in the GCC.125 Several reasons seem to make sense for these countries to join the GCC 
including the cultural similarity between them. All these countries and the GCC share a 
common language, a generally liberal economic system, and civil law.126 There is also a 
great deal of trade between these countries and the GCC.127 For example, the GCC is the 
                                               
124 There are several instances in which regional blocks have been dragged before the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Body for violating WTO law. See for example Turkey-Restriction on Imports of Textiles and 
Clothing Products, WTO Doc. No. WT/BS34/AB/R (1999). See also Brazil-Measures Affecting the 
Imports of Retreaded Tyres, WTO Doc. No. WT/DS332/AB/R (2007). 
 
125 See Haya M. Awad, Jordan's Accession to the Gulf Cooperation Council: An Analytical Economic 
Study 2 (2008) (Unpublished master thesis, University of Jordan). See A.F. Ghoneim, Preparing Yemen for 
Better Economic Integration into the GCC, Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation 13 (2006), 
available at 
<http://www.yemencg.org/library/en/Preparing_Yemen_for_better_economic_integration_into_GCC.pdf>. 
(The GCC summit in Saudi Arabia in 2006 announced the possibility of accepting Yemen as a full member 
in ten years period). The GCC has concern regards Yemen's economic viability.     
126 See John H. Donboli and Farnaz Kashefi, Doing Business in the Middle East: A Primer for U.S. 
Companies, 38 Cornell International Law Journal 413 (2005). See also Lisa Middlekauff, To Capitalize on 
a Burgeoning Market? Issues to Consider before Doing Business in the Middle east, 7 Richmond Journal of 
Global Law & Business 159 (2008).  
127 For instance, Jordan's merchandise trade with GCC amounts to 69.8 of total trade. See Awad, supra 
note125, at 131.   
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biggest single investor in Jordan.128 Moreover, large and growing numbers of Arab 
workers are recruited in the GCC to satisfy employment demands.129  
       The interests expressed by Jordan and Yemen, among others, raise questions about 
the GCC accession process itself. The GCC Charter and other documents lack express 
and detailed provision(s) regarding accession of new members.130 Also, there is no 
requirement of geographical nexus between the GCC and new members. Thus, 
theoretically, Egypt, Lebanon, and Sudan could accede to the GCC. While GCC 
membership is technically open to others, particularly within the Middle East, the GCC 
could be reluctant to proceed with accepting new members from other continents.  
       The expansion of the GCC could prove beneficial. The GCC would form part of an 
area covering a vast portion of the Middle East and Asian continent. Free access to these 
larger markets for materials and manufactured products would be highly advantageous.131 
Elimination of tariffs between the GCC and new members would witness an increase 
trade between the countries concerned. Elimination of other kinds of barriers also would 
assist in increasing the volume of trade. These trade barriers include different 
governmental regulations and different health and safety rules. 
       However, there are could be problems. For example, the GCC has not yet completed 
the integration process among its own members. Extending the integration process before 
                                               
128 The largest sources of investment in Jordan come from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE. Id. at 70.  
129 See A. Kapiszewski, Arab Versus Asian Migrant Workers in the GCC Countries, 
UN/POP/EGM/2006/02, Available at 
<http://www.un.org.org/esa/population/meetings/EGM_Ittmig_Arab/p02_Kapiszewski.pdf> (2006). About 
85 percent of remittances received by Jordan are of GCC origin while in the case of Egypt and Lebanon is 
about 45 percent and in Syria it reaches 65 percent. See Awad, supra note 125, at 75.   
130 There is no provision that would read that any country may accede to the GCC subject to such terms and 
conditions as may be agreed between such country and the GCC. 
131 See S. Chami, S. Elekdag, and I. Tchakarov, What are the Potential Economics Benefits of Enlarging 
the Gulf Cooperation Council? IMF Working Paper No. 04/152 (2004) (enlarging the GGC would lead to 
larger market, lower entry costs, and better market structures).  
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a template "integration model" has been developed and proven successful to a number of 
other countries could be a problem with consequences. Engaging in a process of 
economic integration with Yemen, Jordan, and Syria with different economic and 
political systems can be challenging.132 The GCC could create a development fund or 
bank to aid countries with the most need. The development fund or bank would involve 
all GCC member states by contributing according to the proportion of each state's 
economy. This fund or bank would be similar to the fund created for European 
development that helped raise living standards for Ireland, Spain, and Portugal upon 
joining the European Union.133 
       In addition, cross-border mobility in GCC labor markets could flood local labor 
markets and lead to racial and ethnic tensions within GCC member states.134 Further, 
there is a substantial logistical process involved in implementing the integration process. 
The integration process covers a large number of different technical areas, economic 
sectors, and concepts, and involves the involvement of dozens of officials and experts. 
Supervising the implementation of the GCC common market and negotiating with four 
different countries at the same time presents a difficult duty for GCC's staff. 
                                               
132 GCC countries have larger and more prosperous markets than other countries. In addition, the average 
worker in the GCC is more likely to earn more and pay fewer taxes than the average worker other 
countries. 
133 In the EU, there are the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the European Social Fund 
(ESF), collectively referred to as the EU Structural Funds. The level of development funding provided by 
the EU is impressive. For the period 2007 to 2013, the total funding from EU resources is projected to 
amount to 347.41 billion Euros (approximately $ 538.5 billion), equal to 35.7% of the total EU budget. 
Allocations are made to poorer regions wherever they are located in EU Member States. The bulk of ERDF 
and ESF funding is made available for regions where per capita GDP is below seventy-five percent of the 
Community average. See Jacqueline Brine, The European Social Fund and the EU: Flexibility, Growth, 
Stability 11 (2002). See also EU Directorate General for Regional Policy, Funds Available, 
<http://ec.europa.eu/ regional policy/policy/funds/index en.htm> (last visited Aug. 20, 2010). 
134 Wealthier GCC member states could fear that other Arab workers would flood their labor markets in 
search of employment and more generous social welfare rights. However, the number Arab workers living 
in other GCC member states could decline if there is an economic progress in the home countries as a result 
of integrating with the GCC.  
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       There can be another way to consider the relation between the GCC and its 
neighboring countries. Perhaps the relation between the GCC and its potential 
neighboring countries can be thought of as creating an informal long-term relationship, 
rather than an actual short-term formal relationship. This kind of relationship creates a 
link and a channel of communication. It could be seen as statements of intent, meant to 
create, nurture, and establish a generalized relationship and a tradition of cooperation 
among these countries, rather than an actual free trade area agreement or customs union 
within the short term. In this case, the formal relationship can follow after the GCC has 
developed its own integration template for expansion.  
       The bottom-line question is whether the GCC is developed and successful enough to 
be able to expand and absorb other economies can be extremely hard to answer. It is a 
question with which the EU has been struggling for many years.135 Perhaps the only way 
in which it can be answered is retrospectively; if the GCC can successfully negotiate free 
trade agreements with other countries and if these agreements are successful, then it was 
developed and successful enough to expand. 
       The GCC needs to examine its potential membership negotiations with interested 
countries to determine whether any of its norms, negotiating styles, or positions, or other 
factors, have negatively affected its ability to implement agreements or successfully 
conclude membership negotiations with potential new members. Also, the GCC must 
develop the necessary mechanisms and funds to narrow the gap between existing GCC 
member states and newly acceded countries. The GCC must find ways to order the 
                                               
135 See Carson W. Clements, More Perfect Union? Eastern Enlargement and the Institutional Challenges of 
the Czech Republic's Accession to the European Union, 29 Syracuse Journal of International Law & 
Commerce 401 (2002). See also Peter Katz, The Treaty of Nice and European Union Enlargement: The 
Political, Economic, and Social Consequences of Ratifying the Treaty of Nice, 24 University of 
Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law 225 (2003).  
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relations among native and Arab populations within the GCC. Additionally, the GCC 
needs to arrive at a concrete and clear framework on expansion. As things stand today, 
there are vagueness of membership terms and absence of criteria for GCC accession.  
VI. Recent Developments 
       The U.S has put an increased emphasis on creating free trade areas with GCC 
member states. The U.S. Administration proposed the establishment of a U.S.-Middle 
East free trade area by 2013.136 The U.S. has also signed bilateral trade agreements with 
Bahrain (2004) and Oman (2006).137 There can be several benefits accruing through such 
bilateral trade agreements which include: enhancing goods and services trade; stimulating 
investment flows;138 extending standards on intellectual property rights, labor, and the 
environment; and addressing geopolitical concerns. 
       The decision by Bahrain and Oman to sign free trade agreements with the U.S. 
caused a rift with other GCC member states.139 These free trade agreements could be 
used by the U.S. to gain preferential market access to the GCC. For example, U.S. 
exporters could use a bilateral free trade agreement with Bahrain or Oman to gain duty 
free access to the UAE market.  
       Moreover, the U.S. trade agreements with GCC member states may create bilateral 
trade pattern (trade diversion) which discourages intra-GCC economic ties.140 If all GCC 
                                               
136 See Yerkey, supra note 8.  
137 See Rossella Brevetti, House Approves by Large Margin U.S.-Bahrain Free Trade Agreement, 22 Int'l 
Trade Rep. (BNA) 2031 (Dec. 15, 2005). See Gary G. Yerkey, United States Announces Completion of 
Free Trade Negotiations with Oman, 22 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1603 (Oct. 6, 2005). 
138 See Gary G. Yerkey, U.S. and Bahrain Sign Agreement to Spur Bilateral Trade and Investment, 19 Int'l 
Trade Rep. (BNA) 1105 (June 20, 2002). 
139 See Gary G. Yerkey, U.S. will Continue to Support GCC while Negotiating Bilateral Free Trade Pacts, 
22 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 197 (Feb. 3, 2005). 
140 Economists analyze trade liberalization by considering both trade creation and trade diversion. Trade 
creation occurs when lower-cost imports from one trading partner replace domestic production from the 
other. Trade diversion occurs when lower-cost imports from a third party are prevented from entering a 
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countries do not have comparable free trade agreements with each other, i.e. if they do 
not conclude a single free trade area, then the common denominator will be the U.S. In a 
system of hub-and-spokes, trade between each spoke and the hub will be more than trade 
among the spokes themselves. Therefore, the hub-and-spokes issue has the potential to 
dramatically reinforce and expand U.S. influence. 
       An issue could be raised with regard to GCC member states negotiating individually 
free trade agreements with other countries and whether the GCC, as an institution, has 
legal authority to prevent these free trade agreements. There are indications that the GCC 
would have the ability to block such agreements. The GCC adheres to a common 
commercial policy that is binding on member states.141 This common commercial policy 
is based on principles intended to harmonize economic and market interests among GCC 
member states. If GCC member states had the ability to negotiate free trade agreements 
on their own, this would frustrate the purpose of the common commercial policy. The 
common policy also authorizes the Supreme Council to "approve the bases" for dealing 
with other states or international organizations.142 Furthermore, the GCC Economic 
Agreement requires member states to collectively conclude economic agreements with 
trading partners.143 This indicates that GCC member states are not allowed to enact 
agreements that would endanger established GCC law. 
                                                                                                                                            
signatory country because of tariffs or non-tariff barriers. See Michael J. Trebilcock & Robert Howse, The 
Regulation of International Trade 130 (London: Routledge 1999). 
141 See Economic Agreement, supra note 59, at art.1. 
 
142 See the Cooperation Council Charter, supra note 10, at art. 8.  
143 See Economic Agreement, supra note 59, at art.2. 
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       As a subject of international law, countries are free to enter into relations and 
agreements with other countries.144 Thus, GCC member states have to enjoy treaty-
making power. Any act to the contrary by the GCC would infringe upon an area that is 
considered fundamental to member states' existence. In addition, the WTO encourages 
member states to enter into free trade agreements.145 As a party to the WTO, Saudi 
Arabia would seem to be violating WTO rules if it prevented Bahrain or Oman from 
entering into trade agreements. However, Bahrain and Oman are members of the GCC, 
which means that they are bound to conform their interests to the GCC common 
commercial policy. If Saudi Arabia, for example, considers that Bahrain and Oman free 
trade agreements are against the common commercial policy and prevent them from 
concluding additional trade agreement, Bahrain or Oman could initiate a dispute 
settlement with the WTO. Although the WTO encourages free trade agreements, it is not 
clear how the WTO would resolve the dispute. It is not likely that the WTO would 
intervene in an internal dispute. 
       The GCC should keep close eye on bilateral deals between its member states and 
outsiders. To achieve this goal, clear rules must be developed so as to determine when the 
GCC has exclusive power to negotiate on behalf of all its member states and when 
member states can negotiate international agreements jointly with the GCC to maintain 
their sovereignty. The legal consequences for seeking and concluding free trade 
agreements by GCC member states individually should not be underestimated. 
                                               
144 See Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States, December 26, 1933, art. 1, 49 Stat. 3099, 
3100 (The State as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a 
permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with 
other States).  
145 The GATT provides states should not be refrained from entering into free trade agreements. See 
Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, 
supra note 109.  
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VII. Conclusion  
       Arab countries have embarked upon ambitious continental integration efforts 
designed to fulfill their developmental goals. The formation of regional trade agreements 
in Arab countries and with the GCC was driven by the same economic, political, and 
security considerations. However, by and large, the GCC is generally regarded as a 
success insofar as its incarnations as a free trade area, a customs union, and a common 
market are concerned. The growth of the GCC has been measured and gradual. GCC 
member states have experienced both positive and negative aspects associated with their 
integration agreements. Overall, trade among GCC member states increased, 
strengthening the economic ties among them. However, as a monetary union with a 
single currency, the verdict remains out. 
       The quality of the GCC governance structure is most important. The Supreme 
Council is the most powerful GCC institution and is the head of the GCC governance 
structure. The authority of the Supreme Council is a general one but not is very detailed 
such as in the case of conflict management and other emergencies. The GCC Secretariat 
appears to have no substantive decision-making power and works as an intermediary to 
facilitate state-to-state discussions, negotiations and monitoring. The Secretariat role can 
be viewed as one of servicing negotiations and oversight of obligations. In order to be 
effective, GCC rules must be interpreted in a consistent manner and must be effectively 
enforced. Unfortunately, GCC document simply do not have an effective dispute-
resolution mechanism. The degree of specificity and detail is wanting. There is a need for 
a panel of permanently appointed, objective, professional panelists ensuring a consistent 
interpretation of the GCC's legal norms. This perception ensures that its rulings will be 
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followed by all member states. The absence of an effective and trustworthy dispute-
resolution and rule enforcement mechanism creates major obstacles to the 
implementation and expansion of the GCC. 
       Fundamental to the formation of an integrated GCC is the creation of a common 
legal system. Harmonization of laws facilitates transactions concluded between different 
sovereignties and encourages all forms of economic exchange. Having taken this into 
consideration, and in order to achieve its objectives and aims of establishing a regional 
block, the GCC attempted to harmonize various laws and regulations. 
The introduction of the single currency will affect every aspect of GCC structure and life. 
Therefore, there must be an interim period that serves as a period designed to ensure a 
smooth changeover from national currencies to the single currency. The general 
population should become familiarized with the single currency during the transitional 
period. During this stage, it is important to ensure that the GCC Central Bank will have 
total independence in its decision-making. The GCC is characterized by the ability to 
selectively exit from obligations in specific circumstances considered to be inconsistent 
with national interests. If Oman and UAE felt uncomfortable with the arrangement within 
the GCC they could opt out.  
       The GCC faces many challenges ahead. The GCC does not exist in legal vacuum. 
Rather, GCC is part of the wider corpus of GATT/WTO law. The GCC integration 
agreements have paid little attention to its relationships with the WTO. Issues such as the 
status of WTO law within the GCC, how the multiple commitments of GCC member 
states under GCC law and WTO law can be reconciled, and the rules for resolving 
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conflicts between WTO law and the GCC law have not been addressed by GCC legal 
documents. 
       Relation between GCC and neighboring countries is another sticky issue. The GCC 
Charter and other documents lack express and detailed provisions regarding accession of 
new members. There is no requirement of geographical nexus between the GCC and new 
members. Furthermore, the GCC has not yet completed the integration process among its 
own members. Extending the integration process before a template "integration model" 
has been developed and proven successful to a number of other countries could be a 
problem with consequences.  
       The U.S. signed bilateral free trade agreements with some GCC member states, 
namely Bahrain and Oman. The decision by Bahrain and Oman to sign free trade 
agreements with the U.S. caused tensions with other GCC member states. These free 
trade agreements could be used by the U.S. to gain preferential market access to the 
GCC. An issue could be raised with regard to GCC member states negotiating 
individually free trade agreements with other countries and whether the GCC, as an 
institution, has legal authority to prevent these free trade agreements. By the same token, 
as subjects of international law, Bahrain and Oman are free to enter into relations and 
agreements with other countries. If Saudi Arabia, for example, considers that Bahrain and 
Oman free trade agreements are against the common commercial policy and prevent them 
from concluding additional trade agreement, Bahrain or Oman could initiate a dispute 
settlement with the WTO. Clear rules must be developed so as to determine when the 
GCC has exclusive power to negotiate on behalf of all its member states and when 
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member states can negotiate international agreements jointly with the GCC to maintain 
their sovereignty. 
      Although economic integration among GCC member states is an ambitious step in the 
right direction, there are gaps and challenges ahead. The best way to address the gaps and 
challenges that exist in formulating integration processes in the GCC is to start with a 
clear set of rules and put the necessary mechanisms in place. Integration attempts must 
also exhibit a high level of commitment in order to deflect dynamics of disintegration that 
have all too often frustrated meaningful integration in Arab countries. If the GCC can 
address these issues, it could become an economic powerhouse within Arab countries and 
even Asia. 
 
 
 
